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ABSTRACT 
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) has been hailed as an innovative mechanism of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council. The peer review mechanism evaluates the human rights 
record of all 193 Member States and provides recommendations to further the global promotion 
and protection of human rights. This paper assesses the mechanism, currently in its third cycle, 
in the context of Muslim states. It considers the extent of these states’ commitment to the 
process and argues for a need to move away from mere lip-service to the mechanism and 
engage in meaningful discourse to achieve the objectives of the UPR.  
KEYWORDS: Universal Periodic Review, Human Rights Council, Islamic law, human rights. 
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THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW AND MUSLIM STATES’ ENGAGEMENT 
Amna Nazir*
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR), established in 2006, is an innovative mechanism of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC). The HRC was introduced to replace its 
predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, which was in operation for sixty years before 
its dissolution. Many of the issues surrounding the Commission have influenced the way in 
which the HRC operates, including the UPR. It is therefore important to consider the historical 
context in which the UPR was established in order to fully appreciate its purpose. This paper 
serves two main objectives. First, to provide a comprehensive overview of the Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) and, second, to provide an analysis of the role, or lack thereof, of 
Muslim states1 in the mechanism.  
2. UPR ORIGINS: FROM COMMISSION TO COUNCIL 
Article 68 of the United Nations Charter mandated the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) with creating commissions for the protection and promotion of human rights.2 
Under its mandate, ECOSOC established the Commission on Human Rights in 1946, a charter-
based subsidiary body, which was ‘entrusted with promoting respect for human rights globally, 
fostering international cooperation in human rights, responding to violations in specific 
countries and assisting countries in building their human rights capacity’.3  
The Commission’s work was primarily based around standard setting during its first two 
decades and from 1967 onwards, ECOSOC extended the Commission’s work to promoting, 
monitoring and implementing human rights.4 It began to investigate state-specific human rights 
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1 For the purpose of this article, all state members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (formerly the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference) are considered as being ‘Muslim’ states. 
2 See generally Eibe Riedel, ‘Article 68’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 1011, 1027.  
3 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World - Our Shared Responsibility (2 
December 2004) UN Doc A/59/565, para 282. See also ECOSOC Res 5(I) (16 February 1946) UN Doc E/Res/5(I).   
4 Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment (Routledge 2013) 
15; Ladan Rahmani-Ocora, ‘Giving the Emperor Real Clothes: The UN Human Rights Council’ (2006) 12(1) 
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violations and a complaints procedure was initiated which was accessible to all states, 
individuals and NGOs. Twenty-nine countries were considered under this procedure, between 
1978 to 1985, however coverage was not balanced as certain states such as Iran and South 
Korea were scrutinised whilst other Arab countries and North Korea were not.5 This selective 
nature of the Commission was criticised.6 
In order to address cross-border human rights violations, the Commission created thematic 
mandates which allowed it to deal with widespread human rights abuses across a range of 
states.7 The Commission was criticised for its one-sided form of action as ‘it was the mightiest 
-  militarily, economically and politically - who ran the human rights show’.8 In other words, 
it was mainly Western countries placing developing countries under international scrutiny and 
according to the representative of Iraq, ‘it was forbidden to mention violations occurring in the 
United States and Europe’.9  
Miko Lempinen argues that selective scrutiny could be partly attributed to ‘a different 
understanding of how to address and handle human rights concerns, as well as by a different 
understanding of what constitutes promotion and protection of human rights, or for that matter, 
what constitutes a violation of human rights’.10 For example, during Brazil’s draft resolution 
on human rights and sexual orientation, Muslim states prepared no less than 55 amendments to 
the draft aiming to remove any reference to sexual orientation. According to the representative 
of Pakistan, ‘the issue was not a proper subject for consideration by the commission’.11 
The Commission’s increasing deficiencies paved the way for its ultimate downfall. A number 
of factors have been identified which contributed to the Commission’s demise such as the 
                                                          
5 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights at the United Nations 1955-85: The Question of Bias’ (1988) 32 International 
Studies Quarterly 275, 294. This procedure was largely confidential however, the Commission would publicise 
the list of countries concerning which action had been taken. Inclusion on this list was generally interpreted as 
evidence of serious violations (ibid).  
6 ibid 295. 
7 ECOSOC Res 1235 (XLII) (6 June 1967) UN Doc E/4393; ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVIII) (27 May 1970) UN 
Doc E/4832. See Tom J Farer and Felice D Gaer, ‘The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning’ in 
Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), United Nations: Divided World (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1993) 
279; Phillip Alston, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (OUP 1995) 126; James H 
Lebovic and Erik Voeten, ‘The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in 
UNCHR’ (2006) 50(4) International Studies Quarterly 864.  
8 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/SR.4, para 27 (Mr Khalifa, member of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights). 
9 UN Doc E/CN.4/1992/SR.40, para 38. 
10 Miko Lempinen, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Different Treatment of 
Governments (Abo Akademi University Press 2005) 168. 
11 UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/SR.61, para 60. See also UN Docs E/CN.4/2003/L.106-110; Commission on Human 
Rights Decision 2003/118. 
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increasing politicization of its activities,12 naming and shaming policy in country-specific 
resolutions,13 scrutiny of certain states14 and the absence of membership criteria.15 Rosa 
Freedman has noted that, ‘the expansion of international human rights to cover ever more 
issues, coupled with the body’s increasing loss of credibility in the eyes of the states and 
observers resulted in the Commission widely being deemed to be unable to fulfil its mandate’.16 
A prime example was the case of Iran which was placed under country-specific scrutiny for 
nearly twenty years by the Commission.17 The mandate failed to be renewed after the rejection 
of draft resolution E/CN.4/2002/L.33 in 2002 with Member States criticising the Commission’s 
politicised nature. For example, Algeria observed that ‘despite widespread human rights 
violations during the Shah’s political regime, the Commission had seen fit to condemn Iran 
only since the emergence of the new republic in 1979’.18 It considered the draft resolution 
unbalanced and politically motivated.19  
Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), said the 
organisation opposed selective criticism of some developing and Muslim states and the 
Commission was being used to promote political objectives rather than to advance the cause 
of human rights in the targeted countries. It maintained that, ‘the promotion of human rights 
would not be guaranteed by the adoption of a politically motivated resolution, but through 
dialogue and cooperation’.20 Sudan echoed similar sentiments commenting on the selectivity 
that was practised against some states and how the resolution ‘did not accurately reflect the 
                                                          
12 In the words of Libya, the Commission had become a ‘battlefield for political debate’, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2002/SR.49, para 22. 
13 Donnelly (n 5) 295; Jerome J Shestack, ‘The Commission on Human Rights: Pitfalls, Progress and a New 
Maturity’ in Seymore M Finger and Joseph R Harbert (eds), U.S. Policy in International Institutions: Defining 
Reasonable Options in an Unreasonable World (Westview Press 1982). 
14 ibid. 
15 Elvira D Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the 
First Session’ (2008) 7(3) Chinese Journal of International Law 721-34; Eric Heinze, ‘Even-handedness and the 
Politics of Human Rights’ (2008) 21(7) Harvard Human Rights Journal 41. See also Philip Alston, ‘Richard Lillich 
Memorial Lecture: Promoting the Accountability of Members of the New Human Rights Council,’ (2005-2006) 
15 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 49; Tait Carney, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council’ (2007) 
8 Human Rights and UK Practice 34; Nazila Ghanea, ‘From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human 
Rights Council: One Step Forward or Two Steps Sideways?’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Quarterly 
695. 
16 Freedman (n 4) 17. See also Nico Schrijver, ‘The UN Human Rights Council: A New “Society of the 
Committed” or Just Old Wine in New Bottles’ (2007) 20(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 812.  
17 For a detailed case study of Iran in the Commission, see Lempinen (n 10) 333-45. 
18 UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/SR.49, para 20. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid para 16. 
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recent improvements in the human rights situation in Iran and it made negative references to 
Islam’.21 
The sentiment was shared amongst non-Muslim states too. Cuba voted against the draft 
resolution in an endeavour to put an end to ‘the use of double standards and politically 
motivated draft resolutions that were threatening the credibility of the Commission and 
emphasizing the division between the Powers of the north and the developing countries of the 
south’.22 
The most damning statement came from Iran itself in that:  
The United Nations system had been taken hostage by a powerful minority that 
unsparingly exploited its mechanisms to exert pressure on certain countries. The 
system had lost all credibility and integrity.  
The promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms was the 
primary objective of the United Nations and no country should be immune from 
international scrutiny. However, the existing system of monitoring human rights 
violations was selective, arbitrary, partial and unproductive. To rectify the 
discrepancies of the system in respect of its human rights machinery, and to prevent 
its abuse and manipulation, a spirit of understanding and cooperation among the 
entire membership was essential.23 
Despite its shortfalls, the Commission’s achievements cannot be understated. The conception 
and foundation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights25 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights26 (which comprise the International Bill of Human Rights27) can all be attributed to the 
workings of the Commission which played a principal role in these achievements.28  
3. INTRODUCTION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
                                                          
21 ibid para 24. 
22 ibid para 23. 
23 ibid paras 26-31. 
24 UNGA Res 217A (III), ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1948) UN Doc A/810 at 71. 
25 UNGA Res 2200A (XXI), ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (16 December 1966) UN Doc 
A/6316. 
26 UNGA Res 2200A (XXI), ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (16 December 
1966) UN Doc A/6316. 
27 See, for example, Peter Meyer, ‘The International Bill: A Brief History’ in Paul Williams (ed), The International 
Bill of Rights (Entwhistle Books 1981). 
28 Freedman (n 4) 16.  
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In 2005 the United Nations then General-Secretary, Kofi Annan, published a damning report 
entitled ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’.29 
The report questioned the Commission’s credibility and professionalism with states seeking 
membership for the promotion of self-interests as opposed to the protection and promotion of 
human rights.30 This credibility deficit had ‘cast a shadow on the reputation of the United 
Nations system as a whole’,31 so Annan called for the disbanding of the Commission, arguing 
that: 
If the United Nations is to meet the expectations of men and women everywhere - 
and indeed, if the Organization is to take the cause of human rights as seriously as 
those of security and development - then Member States should agree to replace 
the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights 
Council.32 
Anan’s report advocated for a new body on human rights and was met with general support by 
states and organisations.33 Although there was a broad consensus that the Commission failed 
in its duty and there was a need for a new body to strengthen UN human rights, it was masked 
by grave disagreements about what had actually gone wrong. After a series of negotiations on 
the composition, functions and procedures of the new Human Rights Council, the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 60/251 on 15 March 2006.34 The final text of the Resolution, 
however, only determined basic structural issues, such as election of members and composition 
and issued broad guidelines in respect to the institutional and procedural arrangements of the 
new Human Rights Council.35 
                                                          
29 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Huma 
Rights for All’ (21 March 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005. 
30 ibid para 182. 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid para 183. 
33 See ECOSOC, ‘Summary of the open-ended informal consultations held by the Commission on Human Rights 
pursuant to Economic and Social Council decision 2005/217, prepared by the Chairperson of the sixty-first session 
of the Commission’ (21 June 2005) UN Doc A/59/847; UN Doc E/2005/73 at para 12. 
34 UNGA Res 60/251, ‘Human Rights Council’ (3 April 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251. The Human Rights 
Council was created with 170 states voting in favour, 4 against (Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau, United States) and 
3 abstaining (Belarus, Iran, Venezuela). See UNGA Press Release, ‘General Assembly Establishes New Human 
Rights Council by Vote of 170 in Favour to 4 Against, with 3 Abstentions’ 
<www.un.org/press/en/2006/ga10449.doc.htm> accessed 20 December 2018. 
35 Philip Alston, ‘Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN Human 
Rights Council’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 186. 
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In accordance with Article 22 of the UN Charter,36 the General Assembly established the HRC 
as one of its subsidiary organs,37 thereby elevating its institutional standing in comparison to 
its predecessor. The HRC would therefore assist the General Assembly with the performance 
of fulfilling its mandate on human rights. This suggested a greater international commitment 
towards the protection and promotion of universal human rights as the HRC’s enhanced status 
would make its discussions more visible, influential and authoritative both inside and outside 
the United Nations.38  
The ‘strong and uniting’39 language employed in the Resolution helped convey the need for 
international dialogue, understanding and cooperation between countries, cultures and 
religions. It responded to criticisms of the Commission’s politicisation and selectivity by 
ensuring that the guiding principles of the HRC’s work should be universality, impartiality, 
non-selectivity and objectivity; it introduced ‘a number of innovative elements that would 
make the Council a significant improvement on the Commission on Human Rights’.40  
The main differences between the new Human Rights Council and its predecessor revolved 
around the frequency of meetings held annually, election of members and the creation of the 
Universal Periodic Review; a peer review mechanism designed to strengthen the accountability 
of Member States in relation to their human rights record.41 The concept of a peer review 
mechanism was first raised by Annan during the final session of the Commission42 wherein he 
proposed to abolish the Commission and use a process of peer-review to evaluate and 
implement universal human rights.43 Such a proposal was expected to combat the politicisation 
                                                          
36 ‘The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions.’ 
37 Freedman notes that ‘[s]ubordination is a legal characteristic of subsidiary organs with the GA retaining 
organisational power and control over the bodies’ structure and activities. For example, the GA votes to elect the 
Council’s members; has the power to suspend a Council member; may dictate which situations the body must 
address; and receives an annual report from the Council’. Freedman (n 4) 56.   
38 Kevin Boyle, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: Origins, Antecedents, and Prospects,’ in Kevin 
Boyle (ed), New Institutions for Human Rights Protection (OUP 2009) 12. 
39 UNGA President Jan Eliasson, statement on the draft resolution on the Human Rights Council, GA 60th Session 
(15 March 2006) 4. 
40 ibid 5. 
41 Gareth Sweeney and Yuri Saito, ‘An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights 
Council’ 2009 9(2) Human Rights Law Review 203; Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions (Polity 
Press 2008) 65. 
42 Speech of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Commission on Human Rights, ‘Reforming UN Human Rights 
Machinery’ (7 April 2005) UN Press Release SG/SM/9808 HR/CN/1108. 
43 UNGA, ‘Secretary-General Report, Addendum, Human Rights Council, Explanatory Note by the Secretary-
General’ (23 May 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005/Add.1, para 6. 
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and selectivity of the Commission and would be the key factor in depoliticising the human 
rights body.44 
Annan’s proposal suggested a periodical review of each state thereby preventing the 
‘selectivity bias that had kept some states perennially on or off the Commission’s agenda’.45 
He defined peer review as a process ‘whereby states voluntarily enter into discussion regarding 
human rights issues in their respective countries’46 and findings are implemented ‘as a 
cooperative venture with assistance given to states in developing their capacities’.47  
The mechanism of universal scrutiny would be the driving factor for the success of such a peer 
review process. It would allow states to be subject to assessment by other Member States and 
therefore prevent any single state from evading inquiry into its human rights practices.48  
4. INTRODUCTION OF THE UPR  
Under subsection (d) of Resolution 60/251, the Human Rights Council was mandated with the 
responsibility of monitoring Member States’ compliance with human rights obligations and 
commitments. This was to be implemented through the Universal Periodic Review, a 
mechanism based on:  
objective and reliable information…in a manner which ensures universality of 
coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a 
cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement 
of the country concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-building 
needs.49 
Themes of cooperation, capacity-building and consent were reiterated throughout the 
resolution. The interaction with the wider UN human rights machinery was also addressed by 
ensuring that the Universal Periodic Review ‘shall complement and not duplicate the work of 
[the] treaty bodies’50 which was a main criticism of the Commission.  
                                                          
44 Mathew Davies, ‘Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations’ (2010) 
35 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 449, 457. 
45 ibid 456. 
46 UNGA, ‘Secretary-General Report, Addendum, Human Rights Council, Explanatory Note by the Secretary-
General’ (23 May 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005/Add.1, para 7. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid para 8. 
49 UNGA Res 60/251, ‘Human Rights Council’ (3 April 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251, para 5e. 
50 ibid. 
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Drafting took place over three sessions and a conference was also held in Geneva to discuss 
the different models51 and approaches suggested for the review.52 It was decided that Member 
States would be reviewed every four years53 and the periodicity and modalities would be 
reviewed at the end of the first cycle.54  
The following year, the HRC adopted Resolution 5/1, also known as the ‘Institution Building 
Package’, which provided an overview of the modalities and further expanded upon Resolution 
60/251.55 It listed the objectives of the review as:  
(a) The improvement of the human rights situation on the ground; 
(b) The fulfilment of the State’s human rights obligations and commitments and 
assessment of positive developments and challenges faced by the State; 
(c) The enhancement of the State’s capacity and of technical assistance, in 
consultation with, and with the consent of, the State concerned; 
 (d) The sharing of best practice among States and other stakeholders; 
 (e) Support for cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights; 
(f) The encouragement of full cooperation and engagement with the Council,       
other human rights bodies and the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.56 
The Institution Building Package stressed that the Universal Periodic Review should be a 
cooperative mechanism; an intergovernmental process; operate in an objective, transparent, 
                                                          
51 Models considered included periodic or peer-review mechanisms in the African Union (AU), Council of Europe 
(CoE), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Labour Organisation (ILO), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organisation 
of American States (OAS), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). See also Human Rights Peer Review, Draft 
Concept and Options Paper, prepared by Canada, 29 April 2005 at para 9. 
52 Patrizia Scannella and Peter Splinter, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Promise to be Fulfilled’ 
(2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 41, 63-64; Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, ‘Of Shaming and Bargaining: 
African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ (2009) 9 Human 
Rights Law Review 4; Felice D Gaer, ‘A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body 
System’ (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 113-114. 
53 This has now changed to 4.5 years. 
54 Claire Callejon, ‘Developments at the Human Rights Council in 2007: A Reflection of its Ambivalence’ (2008) 
8(2) Human Rights Law Review 335. 
55 UNHRC Res 5/1, ‘Institution Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ (18 June 2007) UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/5/1.  
56 ibid para 4. 
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non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicized manner; and most 
importantly, promote universal and indivisible human rights.57  
It also identified which human rights commitments and obligations would be used to review a 
state and therefore form the basis of its review. It was agreed that the review would be based 
upon, ‘the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights 
instruments to which a State is party, and voluntary pledges and commitments made by States, 
including those undertaken when presenting their candidatures for election to the Human 
Rights Council’.58 The review criteria also included applicable international humanitarian law 
due to the ‘complementary and mutually interrelated nature of international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law’.59 The inclusion of legally binding and non-legally binding 
human rights instruments as the basis of the review highlights the comprehensiveness of the 
UPR and allows it to build upon the universality, indivisibility and interrelatedness of human 
rights.60  
6. HOW THE UPR OPERATES 
The first UPR cycle commenced from February 2008 and concluded with the twelfth session 
of the HRC’s Working Group in 2011. However, in order to accommodate slightly longer 
reviews by the Working Group, the second and subsequent cycles have been extended to four 
and a half years in length from 2012. Two-week sessions of the Working Group take place in 
February, May and October of each year with fourteen countries being reviewed in each session 
(a total of forty-two countries per year).61 At the time of writing, the third cycle of the UPR is 
underway. 
This change, amongst others, is a product of Resolution 16/2162 which was adopted in March 
2011. It contained the revised modalities for the functioning of the Human Rights Council and 
although a substantial part of the resolution consisted of the Universal Periodic Review, some 
                                                          
57 ibid para 3. 
58 UNHRC, ‘Intersessional open-ended intergovernmental working group to develop the modalities of the 
universal periodic review mechanism established pursuant to Human Rights Council decision 1/103’ (30 
November 2006) UN Doc A/HRC/3/3, p4, para A.  
59 UNHRC Res 5/1 (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1, para 1. 
60 Redondo (n 15) 726; Nadia Bernaz, ‘Reforming the UN Human Rights Protection Procedures: A Legal 
Perspective on the Establishment of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism,’ in Kevin Boyle (ed), New 
Institutions for Human Rights Protection (OUP 2009) 83. 
61 Alex Conte, ‘Reflections and Challenges: Entering into the Second Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review 
Mechanism’ (2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 189. 
62 UNHRC Res 16/21, ‘Review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights Council’ (12 April 2011) UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/16/21. 
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issues remained pending. The HRC completed the review by adopting Decision 17/119 as a 
follow-up to the resolution.63 The implication of this decision allowed the process to become 
fairer and more transparent as discussed below. 
6.1 National Consultations 
The first stage of the UPR involves national consultations where the state under review is 
encouraged to prepare information that it will submit ‘through a broad consultation process at 
a national level with all relevant stakeholders’.64 The consultations, which generally begin ten 
to twelve months before the actual review,65 allow the stakeholders to make significant 
contribution in spreading awareness and knowledge of the UPR mechanism. This, in turn, 
allows key human rights issues, such as protecting the right to life, to be brought to the 
forefront.  
Stakeholders are identified as NGOs, human rights defenders, national human rights 
institutions, academic and research institutions, regional organisations and civil society 
representation.66 Prominent stakeholders raising questions in the UPR of Muslim states include 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Commission of Jurists. 
Other NGOs which have also contributed in the UPR of these states are Alkarama Foundation, 
Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain, Islamic Human Rights Commission 
and Muslims for Progressive Values.  
Civil society engagement in the Universal Periodic Review brings independent and impartial 
perspectives which are needed throughout the whole process in order to provide a balance to 
the state’s performance. It also gives a voice to the marginalized and vulnerable groups which 
highlights the universality and indivisibility of human rights. Civil society is considered a 
‘legitimate representative for the right holders’67 due to their non-governmental nature. It 
therefore has a cogent role to play when a state’s human rights record is being reviewed. 
                                                          
63 UNHRC Decision 17/119, ‘Follow-up to the Human Rights Council resolution 16/21 with regard to the 
universal periodic review’ (19 July 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/DEC/17/119. 
64 UNHRC Res 5/1 (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1, para 15(a). 
65 Lisbeth Arne Nordager Thonbo, ‘The Role of the State’ in Lis Dhundale and Lisbeth Arne Nordager Thonbo 
(eds), Universal Periodic Review First Cycle: Reporting Methodologies from the Positions of the State, Civil 
Society and National Human Rights Institutions (The Danish Institute for Human Rights 2011) 17. 
66 OHCHR, ‘Information and Guidelines for Relevant Stakeholders on the UPR Mechanism [as of July 2008]’ 
available at <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/TechnicalGuideEN.pdf>. 
67 Lis Dhundale, ‘The Role of Civil Society’ in Lis Dhundale and Lisbeth Arne Nordager Thonbo (eds), Universal 
Periodic Review First Cycle: Reporting Methodologies from the Positions of the State, Civil Society and National 
Human Rights Institutions (The Danish Institute for Human Rights 2011) 28. 
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The idea of national consultations is in line with the principle that the UPR must ‘ensure the 
participation of all relevant stakeholders, including nongovernmental organizations and 
national human rights institutions’.68 No detailed instructions, however, are provided on the 
manner in which the consultative national process should be carried out. As a result, only a 
small number of state reports and submissions have identified the specific nature of 
consultations such as the time, location, and number of participants.69 One such example is 
Pakistan which listed the date and location of its consultations with government departments 
and civil society organisations but failed to disclose their identities or the number of 
organisations actually involved.70 Similarly, the UAE held several meetings and workshops 
‘with a wide range of civil society organisations and government bodies’71 but no further detail 
was provided. Consequently, the true level of cooperation and engagement with stakeholders 
cannot be determined and this can include stifling effective discourse on the protection of 
human rights in Muslim states. 
Some states, such as Bahrain, have also been criticised for failing to hold nationally accessible 
consultations. In Bahrain’s review, the state failed to consult with ten highly active human 
rights groups, including the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights despite an appeal to the Prime 
Minister to include them in the consultation process. In fact, the stakeholders that did 
participate revealed that the consultations held ‘were for information not consultation, and that 
their comments had no reflection in the final national report’.72 
Failure to engage in meaningful consultations will only impede the UPR process. One of the 
key reasons for a national consultation process is to allow the stakeholders to provide valuable 
input into the national report. A stakeholder involved in the UPR of a Muslim state can 
therefore contribute towards an accurate and comprehensive portrayal of the human rights 
situation on the ground (domestically) and reflect progressive efforts made by the state to 
ameliorate any human rights violations. Additionally, the influence of stakeholders can help 
identify that the proposed recommendations are substantial, relevant and important.73   
                                                          
68 ibid para 3(m). 
69 Abebe (n 52) 10. 
70 UNHRC, ‘National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(a) of the Annex to Human Rights 
Council Resolution 5/1: Pakistan’ (6 August 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/14/PAK/1, Annex 1.  
71 UNHRC, ‘National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(a) of the Annex to Human Rights 
Council Resolution 5/1: United Arab Emirates’ (13 November 2017) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/1, para 5. 
72 UNHRC, ‘Written Statement Submitted by Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), a Non-
Governmental Organization in Special Consultative Status’ (28 May 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/NGO/42, p. 2, para. 
3.  
73 Thonbo (n 65) 19. 
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6.2 Submission of Reports 
The review of a state is based upon three documents: 1) national report prepared by the state 
concerned, 2) summary of relevant stakeholder reports, and 3) a compilation submitted by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on relevant official United 
Nations documents.74  
The state under review must submit a national report which is restricted to twenty pages in 
length. States are therefore not required to present ‘colossal and factually dense’ reports which 
would be unrealistic given the page limit.75 It must be submitted to the OHCHR approximately 
twelve to thirteen weeks in advance of the review.76  
Stakeholders’ reports need to be submitted six months before the state’s review and they can 
either be an independent individual report, not exceeding 2815 words, or a joint stakeholder 
submission limited to 5630 words.77 Joint stakeholder submissions are given a higher standing 
as it indicates that participating stakeholders were successfully able to reach a consensus 
regarding the human rights situation and were able to propose recommendations to ameliorate 
the situation in the country concerned.78 In the instance of Pakistan, a total of 14 joint 
submissions were provided during its second review, an example being the International 
Association for Religious Freedom and the South Asia Centre for Peace submitting a joint 
statement on freedom of religion and belief.79   
For the third cycle of the UPR, the OHCHR introduced new guidelines for stakeholders in 
order to improve the effectiveness of written submissions and introduced ‘matrices of 
recommendations of countries to be reviewed during the third cycle of the UPR’.80 The aim of 
the matrix is to record precise and specific information regarding the implementation, in the 
                                                          
74 UNHRC Res 5/1 (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1, para 15. 
75 Abebe (n 52) 10. 
76-OHCHR, ‘Guidance Note on 3rd Cycle National Reports’ available at <www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/ohchr_guidance_national_report_3rdcycle_en.pdf>. Tentative 
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77 OHCHR, ‘Universal Periodic Review (Third Cycle): Information and guidelines for relevant stakeholders’ 
written submissions’, para 11 available at <www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-
document/pdf/upr_technicalguidelines3rdcycle_submissions.pdf>. 
78 UPR-Info, ‘The Civil Society Compendium: A Comprehensive Guide for Civil Society Organisations Engaging 
in the Universal Periodic Review’ (2017) 23. 
79 Joint submission 14. For a full list of stakeholder submissions in Pakistan’s review see <www.upr-
info.org/en/review/Pakistan/Session-14---October-2012/Civil-society-and-other-submissions#top>.   
80 The table of matrices is available from the OHCHR website at 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/NgosNhris.aspx>.   
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state under review, for both supported and noted previous recommendations. The matrix 
provides a list of thematically clustered recommendations, such as the death penalty, and allows 
space for ‘assessment/comments on level of implementation’.81  
Stakeholders are encouraged to download their country matrix, complete the relevant section, 
and submit it as an annex to the main contribution (its inclusion does not affect the word 
count).82 In Bahrain’s review, only three out of forty-four NGOs used the country matrix with 
their submission83 and only one used the matrix in UAE’s review.84 Pakistan’s review had a 
total of 44 submissions but no stakeholder made use of the matrix. There seems to be little 
engagement with the matrix which needs to be utilised by civil society in order to identify 
‘challenges or needs of technical cooperation’85 where recommendations have not been 
implemented and to ensure submissions remain relevant and specific.  
Section 5 of the updated guidelines not only details the benefits of the matrices86 but also 
includes practical suggestions such as the use of S.M.A.R.T recommendations for states to take 
forward in the UPR.87 It also mentions other formatting and technical advice such as deadlines, 
word limits, preferred languages of submission, and the use of endnotes and annexes. The 
OHCHR then compiles all the received stakeholder submissions into a single stakeholder report 
comprising a total of ten pages in length.88  
The structure of both the national report and stakeholder reports can follow the General 
Guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council. The reports can include information on the 
national consultation process; the current normative and institutional human rights framework 
                                                          
81 ibid. 
82 OHCHR, ‘Universal Periodic Review (Third Cycle): Information and guidelines for relevant stakeholders’ 
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15 
 
of the state under review; implementation of the human rights framework; cooperation with 
stakeholders; identification of achievements, best practices, challenges and constraints; key 
national priorities; and capacity-building expectations.89 The outcome should be an evaluative 
report that provides a detailed analysis of a country’s human rights record, both the positive 
and the negative, paving the way for future compromises and assistance from other countries.90  
Many states predominantly focus on best practices and achievements in their reports which 
raises the question of objectivity, a point which was raised by the Syrian Arab Republic during 
Qatar’s review. It noted a lack of objectivity in Qatar’s reporting, expressing concerns 
‘regarding the role of charitable institutions in Qatar in the absence of transparency and, also, 
regarding delays in the ratification of international treaties’.91 This proved unfavourable with 
Qatar who wished to respond to the ‘allegations and accusations’.92 Syria raised a point of 
order, indicating that the Syrian statement had been objective:  
In fact, it had displayed restraint and adhered to the principles of UPR since no 
mention had been made of the inhuman role played by Qatar in the Syrian Arab 
Republic. It requested the President to urge Qatar to refrain from using provocative 
language and to respond objectively to the Syrian statement.93  
Whilst such instances illustrate that the UPR is not immune from being politicised, it balances 
state engagement with the presence of stakeholders to allow for a more transparent perspective.   
The OHCHR Guidelines strongly encourage stakeholders to specifically tailor their 
submissions for the UPR and ensure that they contain reliable and credible information on the 
state under review. They should identify issues of concern, possible recommendations and/or 
best practices, cover a maximum period of four years and not contain abusive language.94 All 
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submissions are made available on the OHCHR’s website which adds to the transparency of 
the whole process.95  
The third and final report is compiled by the OHCHR on information contained in the reports 
of human rights treaty bodies, Special Procedures and other relevant UN documents. This 
report is also restricted to ten pages.96 Non-state contributions such as those by national 
stakeholders are accommodated as official documents in the review process which prevents 
any hierarchy among the different inputs.97 
6.3 Interactive Dialogue 
The UPR takes the form of an interactive dialogue which is held in Geneva where the Universal 
Periodic Review Working Group conducts a three and a half hour review.98 The president of 
the Human Rights Council chairs the Working Group which comprises all HRC Member States 
and Observer States.99 Undertaking the review with the members of the HRC sitting as a 
Working Group rather than at a plenary session enables full participation without occupying 
sessional meeting time.100 The duration of the review, according to Matthew Davies, provides 
for ‘more of a schematic overview’ of the country’s situation ‘rather than a detailed 
appraisal’.101 As a result, a schematic overview does not provide much opportunity to discuss 
wider issues concerning Muslim state practice such as use of the death penalty and, for 
example, addressing the deeper theological questions on the subject.  
The dialogue is webcasted live and made accessible on the OHCHR website which is in line 
with the principles of transparency, non-selectivity and equal treatment. Stakeholders with 
ECOSOC status102 are able to attend the session but are not allocated speaking time and are 
therefore excluded from directly interacting in the review dialogue.103 Although this is a 
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drawback to the Universal Periodic Review, it reflects the ideology that the review is a state-
led process.104  
Stakeholders can still make last minute lobbying sessions to governments and also prepare 
parallel events at the UN office in Geneva to raise awareness of the review taking place.105 To 
facilitate NGO lobbying, UPR-Info106 holds ‘pre-sessions’ in Geneva one month before the 
review. This provides civil society with an ‘international platform to directly advocate to state 
delegations ahead of the UPR sessions’.107 There are instances, however, where the state has 
restricted this process. For example, during Sudan’s second review, a group of human rights 
defenders were prevented from attending the pre-sessions.108 Stakeholder lobbying, of which 
this author facilitated, resulted in a cross regional alliance of 14 governments and an NGO 
affirmation (36 NGOs) of a submission to the HRC for the human rights violations under 
President Bashir’s government.109 This influenced the recommendations made at the UPR with 
many states and stakeholders bringing this issue to the attention of the international community 
and holding the state under review to account.110 
The review is guided by the troika which is a group of three Member State Rapporteurs chosen 
by the drawing of lots.111 The state being reviewed can request that one of the three troika 
members is from its own region thereby allowing the state to have ‘a regional ally that 
understands its cultural sensitivities and/or issues relating to capacities for human rights 
protection and promotion’.112 During the first session of the UPR, all the African states which 
were scheduled for review requested this.113 Additionally, a state that is selected to be part of 
troika can recuse itself from the position. This occurred in 2008 where Pakistan declined to 
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serve as a troika member for India’s review due to the history of political tension between the 
two countries.114  
According to Roland Chauville, the interactive dialogue reduces ‘sensitivities surrounding the 
discussion of human rights at the international level. It challenges the notion that human rights 
are a matter of domestic policy and that the involvement of the international community is akin 
to interfering with the sovereignty of the state being reviewed’.115 Therefore, statements such 
as Egypt asserting that retentionist countries ‘need to preserve the death penalty given their 
cultural, political and legal specificities’116 can be respectfully challenged at the UPR; 
contesting the notion that capital punishment is underpinned by state sovereignty and criminal 
justice, and help solidify the argument that it is a matter of human rights. 
The interactive dialogue comprises of two main elements: a presentation by the state to be 
reviewed and a question and answer session. The state under review presents its national report 
regarding the country’s human rights situation and responds to written questions submitted to 
it through the troika. Member and Observer States are then provided the opportunity to take 
the floor and pose questions, present observations, or make recommendations. Member States 
are restricted to three minutes of speaking time whilst Observer States are given two minutes.117   
During the first cycle, on many occasions, state representatives would stay overnight in order 
to enrol onto the list of speakers, which would open at 8.45am the day before the review. 
Moreover, states would adopt strategies that involved getting blocks of allied states to speak 
together thereby enhancing the impact of their praise and using up the majority of the allotted 
time. This tactic was seen in the first review of Bahrain which was dominated by its allied 
states delivering positive statements. Such allies included Palestine, India, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Tunisia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, Algeria, Libya and Cuba.118 Similarly, 
Tunisia’s review heard from numerous allies119 giving the impression that it was ‘an exercise 
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in filibustering’.120 As a result of political and regional allies dominating the review, many 
countries inscribed on the speakers’ list did not get a chance to participate due to insufficient 
time.121  
Regionalism through protecting allied states from scrutiny continued to impact the efficacy of 
most reviews of Muslim states.122 Qatar’s review heard from 49 states123 but only six asked 
critical questions and these were non-OIC states.124 The implications of this are not to be 
understated. Filibustering against Muslim states will dilute the review process and hinder the 
opportunity to question their safeguarding of human rights.  
As a result of this drawback to the UPR mechanism, Decision 17/119 was adopted in 2011 to 
allow the process to become fairer and more transparent for future cycles.  The speakers’ list 
now opens a week before the review and the first speaker is drawn by lot with the list 
proceeding alphabetically from that point. States are permitted to swap places if they should so 
desire. Strict time limits have also been enforced in regards to state speaking time.125 This 
change was seen in Bahrain’s second review which heard from a range of states such as 
Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and the UAE allowing for a more 
balanced approach.126 Hearing from states that are not from the state under review’s regional 
group reduces the chances of bias and unnecessary praise. Hence a non-OIC state will be more 
likely, for example, to question state use of the death penalty and foster critical discussion for 
elevating the right to life.  
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It is important to note that the Human Rights Council makes it clear that ‘the state under review 
is sovereign in addressing the questions and/or issues it chooses to answer of those transmitted 
to it by the troika members or raised during the proceedings of the working group’.127 This was 
reflected in North Korea’s first review where it failed to accept a single recommendation.128 
Refusing to address issues put forth by other Member States, such as the application of the 
death penalty, demonstrates a lack of genuine engagement with the mechanism and suggests 
the state under review is merely paying lip service to the UPR and using sovereignty as a shield 
to avoid investigation into its human rights abuses. 
The state under review needs to address all recommendations put forward to it, providing a 
clear explanation for any recommendations it is unable to accept in order for the international 
community to understand what is preventing acceptance and enable ways to potentially 
overcome this. For example, in Saudi Arabia’s review, it failed to accept recommendations to 
impose a moratorium on the death penalty citing conflict with Islamic law principles.129  
At the same time, it must also be noted that the potential impact of recommendations, on the 
human rights situation of a country, varies depending on the quality of recommendations that 
are issued during the review session (emphasis added). Edward McMahon has categorised 
recommendations on a scale of 1 to 5 depending on the verb that is used in each 
recommendation.130 He describes them as follows: 
1) Category 1: these recommendations require minimal action in comparison with other 
categories. They call upon the state under review to seek international assistance or share 
best practices (verbs in this category would include ‘call on’, ‘seek’, and ‘share’). 
For example, Brunei Darussalam to Qatar: ‘Share its experiences in strengthening its judiciary 
system.’131 
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2) Category 2: these recommendations encourage continuity of actions and/or policies 
(‘continue’, ‘maintain’, ‘persevere’, ‘pursue’). These recommendations are fairly easy to 
implement as they do not demand any change however they can be challenging when the 
state under review is faced with political insecurity, economic cuts or conflict. 
For example, Kuwait to Afghanistan: ‘Continue implementing national policies and 
programmes to improve the living conditions of the people’.132 
3) Category 3: recommendations to consider change (‘analyse’, ‘consider’, ‘envisage’, 
‘explore’, ‘reflect upon’, ‘review’). Such recommendations are generally issued when the 
subject matter is controversial and does not enjoy state support.  
For example, Maldives to Pakistan: ‘Consider removing the reservations made to the ICCPR 
to ensure gender equality and women’s empowerment’.133 
4) Category 4: recommendations that contain a general element. As a result of being so broad, 
they can cause frustration to both the state under review and relevant stakeholders as they 
lack clarity in regards to the method of implementation or measurable outcomes.  
For example, Egypt to Saudi Arabia: ‘Take all necessary measures to protect the rights of 
migrant workers, especially those regarding means of remedies’.134 
5) Category 5: these recommendations require specific actions and ‘demand certain tangible 
or measurable outcomes’. Recommendations on the death penalty predominantly fall 
within this category. 
For example, Sierra Leone to Lebanon: ‘Establish a moratorium with a view to abolishing the 
death penalty’.135  
During the first cycle, more than 21000 recommendations were issued by member states of 
which 4691 were attributed to Muslim states. The second cycle saw a total of 36331 
recommendations of which 8933 recommendations were made by Muslim states, almost 
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double the previous cycle.136 This indicates, in general, the active participation of Muslim states 
in the review process however most recommendations were category four and therefore generic 
in nature. This raises the question as to whether the UPR is indeed being used as a tool to 
engage in meaningful discourse on the furtherance of human rights or whether states are 
viewing it as simply a tick-box exercise.  
Nonetheless, Muslim states’ willingness to participate with the mechanism was reflected in 
their level of political engagement by sending high-level delegations comprising of key and 
prominent individuals such as state ministers, senior officials, or diplomats.137 Countries such 
as Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan sent Ministers of Justice ‘thus affording the process the 
national legal clout that it deserved’.138 However, throughout the first cycle, many countries 
sent delegates from foreign ministries instead of ministers with legal or human rights 
expertise.139 Others such as Bahrain, Pakistan, Indonesia and Algeria sent Ministers or Deputies 
of Foreign Affairs suggesting that they viewed the UPR as a foreign affairs exercise rather than 
a process for the protection and promotion of human rights.140 
6.4 Adoption of Universal Periodic Review Outcomes 
6.4.1 Adoption by the Working Group 
Following the interactive dialogue, the troika prepares a report of the Working Group which 
includes a summary of the proceedings, the issues raised in the interactive dialogue, the 
recommendations submitted by participating Member States and voluntary commitments made 
by the state under review.141 The time between the interactive dialogue and the adoption of the 
outcome report is forty-eight hours.142 
Both accepted and noted recommendations by the state under review are identified in the 
outcome report. Attribution of recommendations was another challenge faced by the HRC. 
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Egypt argued that ‘it is a violation of the sovereign rights of states’143 to imply that all working 
group members have agreed upon a recommendation which in fact has only been proposed by 
one state. The idea that a recommendation is only ascribed to the state which proposes it 
garnered widespread acceptance amongst states. As a result, states can avoid having their 
names attributed to specific recommendations which would technically mean that the Working 
Group does not adopt the recommendations per se.144 This is particularly useful for states who 
may not agree with recommendations that conflict with their own cultural or religious norms. 
Hence Norway’s recommendation to Algeria to ‘take all necessary measures to abolish the 
death penalty and ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR’145 would not be endorsed 
by states such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran or Sudan who cite Islamic law as a barrier to such 
a step. 
Recommendations are therefore considered to be, in essence, ‘bilateral recommendations made 
through the multilateral forum of the Universal Periodic Review’146 and this is reflected in the 
language employed at the end of all outcome reports which states that, ‘[a]ll conclusions and 
recommendations contained in the present report reflect the position of the submitting states 
and the state under review. They should not be construed as endorsed by the Working Group 
as a whole’.147  
The selective and politicized nature of recommendations has drawn criticism of the workings 
of the UPR.148 An example of this is where near identical recommendations have received 
different outcomes depending on the country that submitted them. Recommendations by 
‘likeminded’ states have enjoyed state support whilst those from ‘unfriendly’ states have often 
been rejected.149 During Egypt’s first review, it accepted a recommendation from Bangladesh 
to ‘continue its ongoing review of national laws to ensure that they are in line with its 
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international human rights law obligations’.150 However, it failed to support a similar 
recommendation from Israel to ‘conduct a wide-ranging review of Egyptian human rights laws 
in order to bring them into line with Egypt’s international commitments, as so pledged in its 
Human Rights Council candidature and within its National Report’.151 
Another criticism which arose during the course of the first cycle was states’ failure to provide 
a clear response to all the recommendations received. Approximately 6.5 percent of 
recommendations received a vague and ambiguous response that failed to specify whether the 
state under review had accepted or noted the recommendation.152 One such case was Israel, 
which accepted a total of three recommendations and did not communicate clear answers to a 
number of others.153 As a result, the revised modalities for future cycles require the state under 
review to clearly convey its position on all received recommendations, preferably before the 
plenary session at the HRC.154  
6.4.2 Adoption by the Human Rights Council 
Approximately three to five months after the Working Group session, the Human Rights 
Council will conduct a plenary session to adopt the Working Group’s outcome report. It allows 
the state under review to respond to any issues that were not adequately addressed during the 
interactive dialogue. This is generally preceded by an addendum to the outcome document 
which specifies whether any additional recommendations have enjoyed state support between 
the time of the review and the adoption of the outcome report.155  
The HRC allocates one hour for the discussion of the Working Group documents. The time is 
distributed evenly between the state under review (20 minutes), Member and Observer States 
(20 minutes), and stakeholders (20 minutes) to express their views. It provides the opportunity 
for relevant stakeholders to comment on the outcome report and those states whose 
recommendations were noted can restate their proposals, after which the plenary adopts the 
                                                          
150 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Egypt’ (26 March 2010) UN Doc 
A/HRC/14/17, para 95.3. 
151 ibid, para 97.2.  
152 Chauville (n 115) 103. 
153 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session’ (9 November 2007) UN Doc 
A/HRC/10/29, para 460. 
154 UNHRC Res 16/21, ‘Review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights Council’ (12 April 2011) UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/16/21, para 16. 
155 UNHRC Res 5/1 (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/5/1, at paras 29-32 and UNHRC Res 16/21, at para 12, HRC 
Presidential Statement 9/2, at para 13. The provision of a written communication is called for in UNHRC Res 
16/21, at para 16. 
25 
 
outcome report.156 For example, during the adoption of Iraq’s report, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and Belgium reiterated their 
recommendations to the state to abolish the death penalty as did the stakeholders, Amnesty 
International and Verein Sudwind.157 However, none of these actors made reference to the more 
limited role of Islamic law in this matter which could have strengthened their arguments by 
addressing the status of the death penalty from a religious lens as well as an international one. 
Although Alex Conte describes this stage as ‘little more than a formality and … somewhat of 
a rubber-stamping exercise’158, it is much more than that. This is the only stage where 
stakeholders are given a platform to speak and, having discussed the importance of 
stakeholders in the UPR, it is imperative that their voices are heard in order to make human 
rights violations ever more transparent. 
Furthermore, adoption of the report by the Human Rights Council highlights the state under 
review’s public commitment to implement accepted recommendations and emphasises its 
position on human rights. For example, in Bahrain’s addendum to its outcome report, the state 
acknowledged that death penalty recommendations were not accepted because, ‘[s]uch 
abolition is inconsistent with Bahrain’s constitution and not required by international law’.159 
It therefore allows such views to be challenged by other actors involved in the process. 
6.5 Implementation and Follow-up 
The UPR extends beyond mere reaffirmation of human rights standards by requiring states to 
explicitly accept or note recommendations. As a result, the state under review is faced with 
expectations that it will take progressive steps to implementation.160 The subsequent review 
focuses on the extent to which the previous cycle’s recommendations have been implemented.  
Implementation is one of the fundamental challenges facing the Universal Periodic Review.161 
The UPR needs to ameliorate violations and advance human rights on the ground level by 
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‘translating the recommendations and commitments made…into measurable 
improvements’.162 Recommendations, therefore, need to be S.M.A.R.T163 in order to facilitate 
implementation. For example, a recommendation to simply, ‘consider restricting the death 
penalty’ lacks any specificity for its application. Instead a recommendation to, ‘adopt the 
punishment only for the “most serious crimes” under Article 6(2) and present to Parliament a 
motion for a moratorium within two years’ is measurable and achievable.  
In order to gauge the level of implementation, states are encouraged to submit a midterm 
update, on a voluntary basis, to the HRC in relation to the accepted recommendations.164 
However, due to the preparation and time taken between the state’s review and the adoption of 
its outcome report, the time left for implementation is significantly shortened, resulting in 
approximately three years available for domestic adoption.165   
The third cycle of the UPR, underway since May 2017, has laid an important focus on the 
implementation of accepted recommendations from previous cycles. The OHCHR now sends 
letters, which are publicly available in a spirit of transparency, to each Minster of Foreign 
Affairs after the HRC adopts the UPR outcomes. These letters are sent as part of a constructive 
engagement with Member States and identify 10-15 areas for attention and action in advance 
of the next UPR cycle.166 In his letter to Pakistan, the High Commissioner encouraged the state 
to submit a midterm report by 2020 and highlighted areas in need of particular attention such 
as safeguarding the right to life by encouraging the state to, ‘[r]e-impose the moratorium on 
the death penalty and consider abolishing it. Should it be maintained, it may be applied only to 
the ‘most serious crimes’’.167 
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All 193 UN Member States are expected to cooperate and engage with this peer-review 
mechanism. Resolution 5/1 makes it clear that, ‘cases of persistent non-cooperation’168 will be 
dealt by the Human Rights Council. However, there is no detail or explanation as to what 
exactly would be considered ‘non-cooperation’ of a ‘persistent’ nature. The Geneva based 
NGO, UPR-Info, has produced an outline of what this may be which includes non-participation 
and non-implementation of recommendations. Failure to engage with three or more of the 
following steps, according to UPR-Info, should be deemed as a persistent non-cooperation 
case: 1) submitting a national report; 2) selecting the troika; 3) participating in the interactive 
dialogue; 4) submitting an addendum; and 5) presenting midterm updates on 
implementation.169 It must be noted here that selection of the troika is undertaken by the Human 
Rights Council, by the drawing of lots, so the aforementioned point two is incorrect. So far 
only one state, Israel,170 has refused to engage with the Universal Periodic Review. However, 
the HRC’s response was to simply postpone the review. The steps developed in Decision 
OM/7/1 were considered unsatisfactory and could set a precedent for other countries. A robust 
mechanism is needed to ensure full engagement with the process.171 
7. UPR AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
The UPR also provides a forum to consider the question of cultural relativism which has the 
potential to pose a barrier to the realisation of universal human rights, especially in the context 
of Muslim states. The promotion of perceived Islamic norms is often used as an argument 
against the promotion of universal values and this can be seen, to varying degrees, in the UPR 
of states such as Iran, Maldives, Yemen and Pakistan.172 An examination of their reports reveals 
a number of expressions of cultural relativism which can be used to justify non-adherence to 
international human rights obligations. A vocal proponent in this regard is Iran which argued 
that human rights need to be understood in light of its adherence to Islamic principles which it 
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uses to establish the foundation of its legal system.173 Relying upon, ‘the principle of cultural 
diversity, while respecting and avoiding political and cultural pressures’, it concluded in its 
national report that: 
Any change or adjustments in these laws must come about as a result of dynamic 
national dialogue among our own authorities and civil society in the context of 
Islamic principles. Pressure or demands by other countries to accept and adopt 
certain Western standards of human rights will practically have negative impact on 
promotion of human rights.174 
Another Muslim state, Maldives, stressed that it had embraced and maintained Islamic values 
for the last 800 years. Islamic values were part of the national identity and heritage and formed 
the basis of the Constitution and all Maldives’ laws hence, ‘any efforts to introduce values and 
practices that were contrary to the values of Islam…would not be entertained by the people of 
Maldives’.175  
During Yemen’s review, the state acknowledged the UPR mechanism ‘as a means of improving 
the human rights situation by applying principles of impartiality, objectivity and full 
transparency’176 but failed to mention the principle of universality thereby lending support to 
the cultural relativism argument. Furthermore, during the interactive dialogue stage, Iran 
applauded Yemen’s efforts to promote human rights and address challenges, ‘with due regard 
to national and regional particularities and historical, cultural and religious backgrounds’.177 In 
a similar vein, Egypt encouraged Afghanistan to ‘[c]ontinue to resist attempts to enforce any 
values or standards beyond the universally agreed human rights norms’.178 
Consequently, states may unilaterally reject certain recommendations on the basis that they do 
not concern ‘universally recognised human rights,’ as was claimed by Pakistan during its 
review.179 This has become ‘a rather powerful rhetorical device to contend that the West is 
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perpetuating false universalisms’180 and allows states to immunise themselves from further 
scrutiny. Strong cultural relativism181 has troubling implications for international law as a 
whole and hinders the ability of different cultures to participate in constructive dialogue. 
Colleen Good argues that in order to ensure greater agreement and reduce instances of cross-
cultural misunderstandings, aspects of weak relativism should be considered in that, ‘different 
cultures have different cultural and ethical histories, and that these histories should not be 
brushed aside and ignored, but should instead be examined closely to allow us to further 
intercultural dialogue on subjects such as human rights’.182 The discussion on the death penalty 
in Islam is an example of this. Exploring the historical, cultural and religious background of 
capital punishment in Islamic law will help provide a new perspective and enable further 
dialogue in the UPR with a view to elevate the right to life by subjugating the right to put to 
death. 
7. CONCLUSION 
All Muslim states have engaged with the UPR mechanism albeit to varying degrees. What 
emerges is a common theme of regionalism used to undermine the review process, and this is 
often seen through the use of vague language. Furthermore, a number of Muslim states 
perpetuate a false relativism narrative and use religion to account for a lack of adherence to 
international human rights law such as Iran, Maldives, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. 
Nonetheless, the UPR sheds light on Muslim state practice and international law by providing 
a constructive, transparent and cooperative platform to engage in human rights issues, a much-
needed improvement on its predecessor. Going forward, member states need to move away 
from mere lip-service to the mechanism and engage in meaningful discourse to give credence 
to the objective of the UPR: the global protection and promotion of human rights.  
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